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Abstract
We observe that a Pigovian climate policy need not exact full payment
of the social cost of carbon upon emission to yield optimal incentives. Fol-
lowing this insight, we propose the creation of a carbon liabilities market
to address climate change. Each period, countries would be made liable
for their share of responsibility in current climate damage. This yields
first-best emissions patterns. Also, because liabilities could be traded like
financial debt, it decentralizes the choice a discount rate as well as be-
liefs about the severity of the climate problem. From an informational
standpoint, implementation relies only on realized harm and on the well-
documented emission history of countries, unlike a carbon tax or tradable
permits scheme, which are based on a sum of discounted expected fu-
ture marginal damage. We offer a discussion of the differences between
a liability scheme and a carbon tax along the dimensions of information,
participation, commitment, intergenerational fairness, and exposure to
risk.
Keywords: Carbon Liability, Climate Policy, Market Instruments, Pigovian
Tax.
JEL classification code: Q54, H23.
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1 Introduction
The road to a worldwide agreement to curb climate change is still being paved,
most visibly through the emblematic yearly Conferences of Parties (COP) of
the United Nations. While the 2015 Paris agreement (COP21)—and its con-
firmation by COP22—binds participating countries only to a limited extent,
it remarkably introduces the notion of “Loss and Damage”. In fact, and even
though the word is never spelled out, analysts attribute the progress achieved
by the COP21 to the shift towards liability considerations (Davenport et al.,
2015).
In what follows, we propose a thought experiment to explore how an ap-
proach explicitly based on liability could transform climate policy and its cor-
responding economic instruments. This will require adopting an ex post stand-
point rather than the ex ante approach of all economic instruments introduced
thus far. This work is devoted to exploring the pros and the cons of this re-
versed perspective. We will argue that the latter not only improves the chances
of reaching an agreement while promoting first-best emission abatement efforts,
but also fosters better intergenerational fairness. To implement this approach,
we envision entrusting to an atemporal device (a market for climate debt) the
transfer of wealth across generations. A critical issue, however, is the robustness
of this very same institution, namely its ability to hold governments accountable,
as we shall see.
We will reach the conclusion that choosing between an ex ante or an ex
post policy amounts to choosing between, on the one hand, an absence of long-
term commitment (the ex ante approach) and, on the other hand, a genuine
responsibility towards the consequences of climate change, greater international
participation, and a more equitable distribution of the burden across generations
(the ex post approach). Economic efficiency, however, is unaffected by the choice
of viewpoint. In fact, our thought experiment leads us to the realization that
a Pigovian climate policy need not exact the full payment of the social cost of
carbon at the time of emission in order to yield first-best incentives, as we now
outline.
2 The basic argument
Consider a simple two-period illustration with a single decision maker. She
obtains benefit b (e) from emitting e units of emissions in Period 1. A fraction
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γ of these emissions will remain in the atmosphere, leading to h× (γe) units of
harm in Period 2. Hence, h can be thought of as the social cost of carbon per
unit of greenhouse gas (GHG) residing in the atmosphere. Under an optimal
carbon tax, the decision maker is required to pay τ = βE [γh] per unit of e at
the time of emission, where β is the discount factor adopted by the tax setter
and E is the expectations operator. Consequently, the decision maker chooses
her emissions level upon maximizing her total (period-one) payoff:
max
e
b (e)− τe = max
e
b (e)− (βE [γh]) e, (1)
so that b′ (e∗) = βE [γh]. If β is actually chosen so as to match the discount
factor of society, the resulting emissions level is socially optimal.
Suppose instead that the decision maker is only required to pay the (undis-
counted) harm, µ×e = h×γe, when it occurs in Period 2. Her objective is now
to maximize the discounted sum of her payoffs:
max
e
b (e)− βE [µ] e = max
e
b (e)− β (E [hγ] e) ,
where β now follows from the decision maker’s own preferences. Because the
objective appears to be unchanged, her emission decision, e∗, is the same as
under the optimal carbon tax, because it is such that b′ (e∗) = βE [hγ]. If β is
equal to the discount factor of society, the resulting emissions level is socially
optimal.1
Following this insight, we describe what could be a policy instrument: a
carbon liability market. Upon emitting CO2 in the atmosphere,
2 countries are
issued carbon liability commensurate to their emissions. Liability bearers are
legally bound to pay damages over time as climate harm occurs.3 This effectively
requires them to pay for harm ’upon delivery’ rather than upfront, as would be
the case with a carbon tax. Carbon liability does not expire, but instead decays
at the same rate as atmospheric CO2, all the while holding bearers accountable
1Notice, however, that this second approach allows for harm to be observed before payments
are made, so that the decision maker never has to pay out-of-pocket amounts linked to harm
that is still hypothetical. From the standpoint of political acceptability this may be a key
difference, as we shall see.
2For expositional purposes, we shall speak only in terms of CO2.
3Clearly, the issue of determining the magnitude of anthropogenic climate harm is a difficult
one. Note, however, that this question is by no means resolved with a carbon tax. In fact
it is made even worse, because predicting the harm caused by a ton of carbon emitted today
decades or centuries into the future is a much more heroic feat than assessing the responsibility
of past emissions in (observed) harm occurring today.
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for paying carbon damages over time.
Simply put, our proposal consists in converting CO2 emissions into national
(financial) debt. We shall suppose that debt payments are devoted to com-
pensating participating countries to the tune of climate harm incurred.4 By
spreading payments over the long run, a liability scheme avoids the problem
that arises when current generations are asked to pay for the sole benefit of
future generations, as is the case for all carbon pricing policies proposed to
date. To be clear, because individuals and firms are too short-lived to be held
accountable in the long run, we suppose that the only entities authorized to
hold liability are countries.5
Also, carbon liability can be traded on a market. When purchasing extra
liability, a country commits to repaying the corresponding climate debt, as
future harm occurs, for as long as it bears it. In turn, a seller of liability will be
exempt from the associated debt payments. Trade will occur at a price between
what the seller is willing to pay and what the buyer is willing to accept to
endorse the liability.
To build upon our previous example, consider now that carbon liability
is traded on a world market at price p and denote by X the net quantity
of liability sold by the decision-making country. Thus, it maximizes b (e) −
βE [hγ] (e−X) − pX − C (p (e−X)) over e and X, where C is a convex cost
function associated with holding climate debt.6,7 We assume that countries
choose to accumulate debt only to the extent that it brings positive net benefit;
hence, that C ′ < 1. This yields the following first-order conditions:
e : b′ (e∗) = βE [hγ] + pC ′ (p (e∗ −X∗)) , (2)
X : p = βE [hγ] + pC ′ (p (e∗ −X∗)) . (3)
Equations (2) and (3) together express the fact that, when faced with liability
price p, a country sets its emissions so that its marginal benefit equals this price:
b′ (e∗) = p. From that emission level, whether a country chooses to purchase or
4How revenues are used is a question in and of itself. We address this issue in a separate
paper (Billette de Villemeur and Leroux, 2011).
5We use the word ’country’ somewhat loosely. Presumably, nothing prevents the scheme
to be applied at a lower level—say at the province or state level in a federal state—provided
the corresponding entity is enduring.
6Note the minus sign in front of pX. A seller of liability actually pays the buyer to hold it
in her stead.
7In practice, national economies often incur extra costs due to increased borrowing con-
straints as debt grows (Wachtel and Young, 1987; Engen and Hubbard, 2004; Laubach, 2009).
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Figure 1: An individual country’s decision. Facing liability price p, emis-
sions are determined by b′(e∗) = p. If the country’s discounted value of ex-
pectated (global) marginal harm is relatively low (β1E1[hγ]) it will choose to
purchase some liability: X∗1 < 0. Conversely, if it is relatively high, the country
will choose to sell some: X∗2 > 0. If it is so high as to lie above the liability
price, the country will emit e∗3 < e
∗
1 = e
∗
2 such that b
′(e∗3) = β3E3[hγ] > p and
sell all of its liability: l∗3 = e
∗
3 −X∗3 = 0.
sell liability depends on its discounted value of expected global marginal harm
(Figure 1). Countries expecting relatively low discounted marginal harm—i.e.,
countries with a low value of βE [hγ], either because they are skeptical about
climate change or because they have little concern for the future—will purchase
liability (X < 0). They will do so up to the point where the marginal cost of
accumulating climate debt compensates the gap between their expectation of
discounted marginal harm and the liability price. Likewise, countries with high
expected discounted marginal harm will sell some liability.
In equilibrium, the market-clearing price, p, emerges endogenously as the
’global’ social cost of carbon (Figure 2). Carbon liability acts as a tradable
Arrow-Debreu-type security that makes markets complete, thus yielding alloca-
tive efficiency through decentralization. Corner solutions are possible, corre-
sponding to situations where some countries have such a relatively high marginal
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Figure 2: Liability price determination. Emissions are decreasing in the
liability price: If p2 > p1, then e
∗
2 < e
∗
1 from the downward-sloping marginal
benefit curve, b′(e), and the fact that βE[hγ] +p2C ′ (p2l) (which determines l∗2)
is steeper than βE[hγ] + p1C
′ (p1l) (which determines l∗1). When the price is
sufficiently high, there is excess demand of liability on the market (X∗2 < 0);
conversely, a low price leads to excess supply (X∗1 > 0). In equilibrium, the
market clears (X∗eq = 0).
expected damage—βE [hγ]—that they would sell all of their liability. However,
in that case, these countries would actually emit even less than the market price
of the liability would imply: for them, b′ (e) > p (Country 3 in Figure 1).
Notice that the equilibrium liability price is greater than the expected harm:
peq ≥ βE[hγ] (by Expression 3). This is because of the cost of holding debt,
which reflects the default probabilities of countries. At the country level, the
higher the default risk, the larger that country’s marginal cost of holding lia-
bility, and the greater the incentive to get rid of it. At the aggregate level, this
puts an upward pressure on the liability price—a seller must offer to pay more
to find a willing buyer—which, in turn, reduces global emissions.
We have laid down the basic logic of a carbon liability scheme. At first
sight it appears to be equivalent to a carbon tax. However, climate change is a
peculiar externality problem for two reasons. First, it covers an unusually long
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timespan: some GHGs stay in the atmosphere for hundreds of years (Archer,
2005), with climate consequences to match. Second, the climate problem is
surrounded by radical uncertainty, owing to the fact that we may be entering
climate regimes yet unseen (IPCC, 2013). This will induce profound differences
between the ex ante and the ex post approach, which deserve further scrutiny.
After relating our work to the literature, the bulk of this work will be devoted
to discussing the advantages and drawbacks of a liability scheme relative to a
carbon tax.
3 Relation to the literature
The idea of using liability as a means to control externalities traces back to
Calabresi (1970) and was recently compared to corrective taxation in Shavell
(2011). On the one hand, regulation (i.e., taxation) is costly even in the absence
of harm, whereas liability only kicks in when harm actually occurs. On the
other hand, a liability approach is typically more informationally demanding
because it requires establishing tort (Kolstad et al, 1990; Shavell, 2011) or
at least being able to observe the level of precautionary effort exerted by the
examined party (Hiriart et al., 2004, 2010).8 Hence, liability is likely to be more
appropriate in situations where harm is highly uncertain but where its source
can be easily established. This is precisely the case of climate change, where
the magnitude of harm is typically unknown ex ante but the responsibility
of countries towards CO2 concentration can be readily established thanks to
available data on cumulative CO2 emissions per country (e.g., from the World
Resource Institute or the World Bank databases). The general argument echoes
that of Shleifer (2012), according to which the need for regulation arises where
litigation is ineffective. Underlying this line of reasoning is the notion that
turning to litigation (read liability) is a most natural reflex that should be left
unhindered whenever it is an efficient option.
The use of liability to address the climate problem is further supported by
insights from the cost-sharing literature. An important lesson to be learned
from that literature is that the best properties of a payment scheme—whether
in terms of efficiency, incentives, and even fairness—arise from mimicking the
8The liability approach is usually discussed in the context of tort law, involving private
parties and legal costs attached to lawsuits, to establishing due care and negligence. By con-
trast, the liability approach we consider here is public, in the sense that it involves countries,
and would consist in an automatic procedure where the negligence rule plays no role.
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physical features of the externality to be managed (Moulin, 2002). Climate harm
being a problem caused by the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere, it is thus appro-
priate to condition payment on emission stocks rather than on emission flows as
do the carbon tax and cap-and-trade programs. By making explicit—and, most
importantly, financial—the somewhat intangible carbon debt that mankind ac-
cumulates along with atmospheric CO2, carbon liability does just that.
In a climate change context, liability has very recently been proposed as a
means to make global cooperation more effective and less costly in the long run
(Gampfer, Gsottbauer and Delas, 2014). Its merit lies in the fact that countries
are more likely to adhere to an agreement on emissions reductions if they believe
they will be compensated fairly for future climate damage incurred (Gampfer,
2014). As in Billette de Villemeur and Leroux (2011), the argument in these
works is one of fairness. Ours is mainly one of economic efficiency in that,
as compared to a carbon tax, a liability scheme provides the same (first-best)
incentives to emit yet makes participation more appealing. This reduces the
distortions that usually arise due to limited participation : liability mitigates
the externality on a larger scale (more participants) and garners participation
without compromising efficiency.
Our contribution is related to the literature on green accounting, which in-
corporates environmental externalities into national accounting (see Weitzman
1976; Hartwick, 1990; or, more recently, Cairns, 2004, Cairns and Lasserre,
2006). The goal there is to give an intertemporal account of a country’s avail-
able resources so as to measure how much is left to future generations. Many
indicators, environmental and otherwise, including more than 150 Sustainable
Development Goal Indicators proposed formally by the United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Council (UN Economic and Social Council, 2016), have flour-
ished over the last decades. While informative, they are only tenuously tied to
precise action, if at all. This calls into question the incentives they are able
to generate. One may also wonder about the incentives to keep on devoting
resources to generating accurate values for these indicators over the long run if
they do not directly affect policy.
By contrast, our proposal consists in providing an indicator of indebted-
ness that directly impacts policy, because liability implies payments upon the
realization of harm. Moreover, the financial stakes involved generate powerful
incentives to provide accurate predictions of future harm. As such, our work is
in line with the burgeoning literature on stakeholder value. The latter argues
in favor of moving away from the conventional shareholder value maximization
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to stakeholder value maximization (Magill et al., 2015). In our proposal, the
financialization of carbon emissions as debt can be seen as giving voice to global
(and future) stakeholders.
Many authors have proposed alternatives to a carbon tax and to cap-and-
trade programs with the aim of facilitating global cooperation. Closely related
to ours is the proposal of Gersbach and Winkler (2012) that reverts the Pigo-
vian logic, effectively transforming the carbon tax into an abatement subsidy.
Countries would initially contribute large lump sums to an international climate
fund and would be refunded over time proportionally to their abatement efforts
relative to a business-as-usual scenario. While we retain their use of an interna-
tional climate fund to collect and redistribute monies to countries, we view the
large entry cost as a significant obstacle to their ’global refunding scheme’. An
attractive feature of our proposal is that, although generating proper incentives,
it reduces substantially the participation cost of countries.
Naturally, estimating harm is central to the climate problem. Therefore, our
work is related to the vast literature on the social cost of carbon. The most pop-
ular approach in the past decades has been to construct integrated assessment
models (IAMs) that combine the dynamics uncovered by both climate science
and economics (see Tol, 2009, for a review). While increasingly sophisticated,
IAMs are also becoming dramatically less transparent for policy makers. Very
recently, research efforts have been made to provide more intelligible estimates
of the social cost of carbon. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model, Golosov et al. (2014) find a formula for the optimal carbon tax that
does not rely on future values of output, consumption or stock of CO2 in the
atmosphere. While a remarkable feat, their formula cannot do away with the
discount factor, however. Bijgaart et al. (2016) propose a closed-form solution
for the social cost of carbon. There, too, knowledge of the discount factor is
required. By contrast, an advantage of our approach is that it does not require
taking position on the discount factor to compute liability payments, which are
only based on realized harm. Yet, for countries to make efficient decisions, they
each will have to adopt a discount factor and make predictions about future
harm, for which those recent advances will be highly valuable.
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4 The pros and cons of a liability scheme
We now discuss the advantages and drawbacks of a liability scheme relative to a
carbon tax. Our arguments are organized along the dimensions of information,
participation, commitment, intergenerational fairness, and exposure to risk.
4.1 Information
We first compare the carbon liability approach to the carbon tax on informa-
tional grounds.
4.1.1 Advantages
Recall that the optimal carbon tax rate is equal τ = βE [γh]. We examine
each component in turn, keeping in mind that carbon liability payments are
determined by µ = hγ.
E [h]: Ex post vs. ex ante. The carbon tax follows a resolutely ex ante
approach. In particular, its amount is established on the basis of the expected
discounted future harm. By contrast, carbon liability requires payments to
be based on realized harm. By nature, it thus inherits all the informational
advantages attached to an ex post approach. Primarily, the fact that harm is
actually realized at the time of payment makes it possible to measure: payments
do not depend on hypotheses about the distant future. It also prevents countries
from strategically downplaying their expectations about future harm.
Of course, even realized harm is difficult to measure. First, like in any field
of empirical research, one may expect studies to lead to a range of estimates
rather than to a unique number. Moreover, disentangling between harm that
is caused by human activity and harm that would have occurred naturally is
itself a daunting task. The very concept of man-made harm is implicitly based
on a counterfactual scenario without anthropogenic emissions. In other words,
assessing man-made harm relies on comparing an observable situation to a hy-
pothetical one. While such an endeavor may raise skepticism, it is actually
better grounded than estimating the optimal level of a carbon tax, which actu-
ally relies on the comparison of scenarios that are all hypothetical—and about
the distant future, at that.
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β : Objective vs. subjective. Because the optimal level of a carbon tax
reflects expected discounted marginal harm, its computation relies on a subjec-
tive parameter, namely the rate of time preference. Yet, eliciting preferences
has always been considered a difficult exercise. On may suspect countries to
misreport their rate of time preference in order to influence the tax rate in their
favor.
By contrast, the implementation of carbon liability requires only knowledge
of objective parameters: the stock of emissions attributable to each country
and the marginal harm. Hence, there is no room for strategic manipulation by
misreporting β or any other subjective parameter.
Moreover, the fact that the discount factor does not enter the computation
of liability payments actually allows the scheme to accommodate heterogeneous
time preferences across countries. As we shall discuss in Section 4.2.1, this
eliminates the need for a consensus on the discount factor to be used.
Of course, this greater degree of decentralization (as compared to the carbon
tax) raises the question of whether countries would not tend to downplay the
importance of future generations by adopting low discount factors. There are
actually two questions: Can a country “adopt” a discount factor that is different
from that of its population? And: Can the (actual) discount factor of a country
be too low?
If decision makers display a systematic bias for the present—say, to inflate
their performance while in office, for electoral concerns—the carbon liability
scheme would fail to implement the optimal emissions path. However, those very
same considerations currently lead decision makers to adopt lower-than-optimal
carbon tax rates. Actually, this problem does not follow from a difficulty in elic-
iting preferences. Rather, it is a political economy problem that arises from the
fact that decision makers have goals that differ from aiming at reflecting exactly
the preferences of their constituency. As we shall see in Section 4.4.2, a carbon
liability market better aligns the choices of decision makers with the interests of
the population, by making more visible future consequences of current policies.
The real question surrounding a country’s choice of β is about whether the
current generation places enough weight on the welfare of future generations.
However, unless one takes a paternalistic stance—for instance, on the grounds
that future generations are not represented—and decides a priori what the cor-
rect value of β should be, the appropriate value is actually that of the (present)
population. Along this line, as already mentioned, the carbon liability scheme
outperforms the carbon tax in that there is no need to elicit the time preferences
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of the population: by design, the incentives to the current generation reflect the
exact value of the discount factor.
E [γ]: Tax on stocks vs. tax on flows. Climate harm, which is stochastic
by its very nature, depends on the current concentration—i.e., the stock—of
GHGs in the atmosphere. It is thus related to past emission flows, although
only indirectly. The relationship between past emission flows and GHG concen-
tration is often expressed by means of a decay rate, which summarizes complex
geophysical and atmospheric phenomena and depends notably on GHG concen-
tration (Prather, 1996; IPCC, 2001). Although this relationship is most likely
deterministic, an accurate computation of the carbon tax rate still requires i)
an exact prediction of these complex natural phenomena over the very long run,
and ii) a complete forecast of future emissions over the very long run. The latter
follows from the fact that GHG concentration at a future date will depend on
today’s emissions and also on all emissions until then. As a result, the decay
rate can be considered to be unknown to the decision maker, who must rely on
an expected value only.
By contrast, carbon liability mimics the physical nature of the externality
by directly relating realized harm to the current stock of emissions attributable
to each country. It follows that there is no need to construct emissions scenarios
because payments rely only on past emissions. The stock attributable to each
country is computed from the knowledge of its past emissions and of the decay
rate. The former can be obtained from national accounting on the most GHG-
intensive industries (fossil fuels, cement, steel, etc.). The latter can be directly
computed as the ratio of current GHG concentration (net of current emissions)
and previous GHG concentration. All calculations are thus fact based rather
than scenario based.
4.1.2 Limits
A displaced informational burden. The informational advantage identi-
fied above should not hide the fact that carbon liability displaces the infor-
mational burden onto countries. Indeed, whereas the planner need not make
predictions about future harm scenarios or pinpoint a discount factor, it is up to
the countries themselves to do so. In fact, making predictions about man-made
climate harm and taking a stance on the weight to be attributed to future gen-
erations are simply inescapable. Whatever the approach, climate change will
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remain an intertemporal problem over the very long run that is characterized
by severe uncertainty.
Yet, forecasting man-made climate harm need not be a solitary exercise,
to be made redundantly by each country. Instead, while countries remain free
to reach their own conclusions, their forecasts can result from a cooperative
process, or they may gather information from an outside independent agency
(the IPCC comes to mind). Furthermore, while each country must adopt a
discount factor, it does not need to agree with others on its value under a
carbon liability approach. We view this very fact as an advantage rather than
a drawback (see Section 4.2.1).
Lessened incentives for adaptation. Because harm is compensated under
a carbon liability approach, the latter presumably undermines the incentives
of countries to take adaptive measures to reduce climate impacts within their
borders. It is the very same moral hazard problem that plagues insurance
markets, for instance, which explains why insurance policies rarely allow for
complete coverage. As a result, insured parties must still face residual risk even
though it would have been possible to fully insure them absent this moral hazard
problem. Similarly, in order to sustain adaptation efforts, it seems desirable to
limit the extent to which climate harm is compensated, and to compensate
harm only above a certain threshold (the equivalent of a deductible). This has
the advantage of not requiring the evaluation of small harm but only calls for
evaluation after occurrences of ’severe’ harm, the magnitude of which should be
defined collectively.
However, the moral hazard problem does not prevent insurance markets
from being both profitable and beneficial to society. Despite the downward
incentives on adaptation, we still believe that it is desirable to compensate
countries affected by man-made climate harm, especially because those who are
most impacted are often not those who emit the most. In essence, we believe the
public bad nature of the climate change problem supersedes this moral hazard
concern.
On top of these considerations, it is worth noting that holding a carbon
liability actually provides incentives for adaptation. It effectively transfers in-
centives from the countries that incur the climate harm to the liability bearers.
The existence of a global liability price will generate incentives for countries
holding high liability positions to invest in adaptation wherever it is most pro-
ductive (including outside of its borders), thus fostering the efficient allocation
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of adaptation efforts.
4.2 Participation
Many of the advantages of using a carbon liability market over a carbon tax
pertain to participation. We discuss them in turn.
4.2.1 Increased decentralization
A clear advantage of the liability approach is that payments do not depend upon
forecasts of man-made climate harm nor on any discount factor. Accordingly,
countries do not need to agree along these two dimensions in order to participate
a carbon liability market. Each country can have its own beliefs about future
climate harm and its own attitude towards future generations by choosing the
amount of liability it wishes to hold.
This has strong implications in terms of international participation because
it circumvents the controversies over the expected impact of climate change
and the unending debate over the appropriate discount factor.9 By reducing
the number of dimensions on which countries need to agree, one can expect a
carbon liability market to greatly facilitate the negotiation process toward a
powerful climate treaty.
4.2.2 Incentives to participate in the market
In addition to enhancing participation by increasing decentralization, a carbon
liability market promotes participation from countries that may initially have
little interest in a scheme aimed at reducing GHG emissions. This follows from
the profit opportunities that comes with participating in any market. In fact, to
take an extreme example, even a country that denies the existence of a climate
problem will want to participate in a carbon liability market: to this country,
the purchase of any unit of liability comes with a windfall of p, for a much lower
(perceived) cost. Either for genuine environmental concern or for financial gain,
a carbon liability market can be expected to garner the participation of many
countries.
With a carbon tax, on the other hand, participation is very difficult to obtain
from any but the most concerned countries. In particular, for the climate-skeptic
country of our example, it is simply a nonstarter.
9See, e.g., Weisbach and Sunstein, 2008, for a review of the terms of the debate.
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4.2.3 State sovereignty
A difficulty attached to global endeavors is that governments do not like to be
bound in their policy choices. As such, a global carbon tax can be considered
as very intrusive. By contrast, a carbon liability approach offers countries more
freedom in how to tackle the climate issue. In fact, a carbon liability converts
emissions into financial debt. It is then up to each country to devise its own
policy in order to achieve the desired level of emissions and to finance the cor-
responding debt. This can be done through a (national) tax on emissions, a
tradable allowance scheme, or any other instrument (or mixture of instruments)
of that country’s choice. State sovereignty is thus a further argument towards
the adoption of a liability approach.
4.2.4 Payments are spread over time and match realized harm
A difficulty attached to the carbon tax is that it demands emitters to pay imme-
diately for all subsequent expected damage. This creates significant hurdles for
participation for two reasons. First of all, it requires emitters to pay ’up front’
for the entire future harm attached to their emissions. But also, it makes emit-
ters pay for harm that is still uncertain, and which may or may not materialize
in the end.
Carbon liability does not suffer from either of these drawbacks because they
require emitters to pay over time as harm occurs. By delaying payment, the
initial phase of a climate agreement is a smooth process rather than a shock
therapy. More importantly, carbon liability payments match realized harm.
This has two important advantages. For one thing, carbon liability does not
involve out-of-pocket payments if no harm occurs. For another, if realized harm
exceeds expected harm, carbon liability guarantees that sufficient funds will
be collected to compensate those that end up suffering from climate harm. In
other words, being an ex post instrument, carbon liability can better handle
distributional concerns, both with respect to emitters—who will not be unduly
solicited—and with respect to victims of climate harm—who will not be left
uncompensated. These are clear advantages over the carbon tax that make
carbon liability more likely to rally supporters.
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4.2.5 Incentives to adapt, which lower the overall cost of climate
change
The carbon tax, by its ex ante nature, disregards entirely the actual realization
of harm. As a result, there are no incentives for emitters to make adaptation
efforts outside of its borders because each country is left alone in the face of
the consequences of climate change. By making adaptation beneficial to all
countries holding liability, a carbon liability market turns adaptation into a
public good. Like all public goods, it is subject to the well-known problem of
under-provision. However, it is in the interest of all countries to put in place
institutions or mechanisms to overcome this problem.
One possibility would be to keep track of the adaptation efforts of each
country and credit them for a substantial part of the returns (i.e. avoided
harm). This privatization of sorts of the returns to adaptation would provide
efficient incentives for countries to invest in adaptation and to seek out the most
profitable opportunities around the globe. It would also provide a means for
countries to hedge their liability positions against climate risk.
The incentives to make adaptation efforts that are attached to a carbon
liability market will translate into lower expected harm. As a result, even in
expected terms, an ex post approach is likely to be cheaper than an ex ante one,
and hence easier to adopt.
4.3 Commitment and credibility
This section examines the liability approach through the lens of commitment,
which is certainly the most controversial aspect of our proposal.
4.3.1 Unconcern for future generations and strong incentives for
renegotiation (but not worse than postponing)
An obvious limit of a carbon liability approach is that it requires countries to
commit to honoring their payments over the very long run. This raises two po-
litical economy-related problems, both across generations and across countries.
Across generations: Political short-termism First, the relatively short-
sighted nature of politicians, due to short term lengths, may induce them to
neglect the burden they impose upon their successors. As a result, and al-
though they may be eager to participate in a carbon liability market (as seen
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in Section 4.2.2), governments may tend to underestimate the (future) cost of
emitting (today) and be inclined to allow for more emissions than would be
in the country’s (intertemporal) interest. One can expect this lack concern for
future generations to undermine the efficiency of a carbon liability market.
However, the carbon tax is not immune to the shortsightedness of politicians,
either. The latter simply takes on a different form, whereby the implicit price of
carbon in effective tax rates—and cap-and-trade prices—are widely considered
by experts to be far below most reasonable estimates of the social cost of car-
bon. Moreover, by making visible the debt left to future generations a liability
approach appears better equipped to fight against the shortsightedness of gov-
ernments. It does so by generating an indicator—financial climate debt—that
civil society can use to monitor the decisions of its rulers (see Section 4.4.2).
Across countries: Temptation to default on liability payments The
second problem arises between liable countries and those who are to be com-
pensated. Indeed, as time goes on and as the burden increases over time, one
may expect liable countries to choose to default on their liability payments. This
could leave countries affected by climate change without the compensations they
were promised, with possibly dramatic consequences to their populations. This
is a legitimate concern, which should not be ignored. That being said, a carbon
liability market actually provides an incentive device towards honoring liabil-
ity payments through the ’financialization’ of climate harm. Indeed, defaulters
would not simply have to bear the moral consequences of reneging on their
commitment, but would also suffer financial setbacks: Under a carbon liability
scheme, failure to honor liability payments is no different than defaulting on
financial debt.
From a moral point of view, however, there is a difference in the nature of
these debts. In the case of default on financial debt, those affected are creditors
who had chosen to expose themselves to financial risk. By contrast, defaults on
liability payments are likely to impact the residents of vulnerable countries that
did not choose to expose themselves to climate risk.10 This makes the problem
of defaulting of particular prominence from a moral standpoint.
This temptation is no worse than that of postponing the carbon tax
By definition, the carbon tax raises no such commitment issues because pay-
ments are made at the time of emission. Nevertheless, instead of the issue of
10We thank Yann Kervinio for this observation.
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honoring payments, it is the very willingness to participate in the mechanism
that is fragile. The issue there is a desire for politicians of emitting countries
to postpone the implementation of a carbon tax in order to enjoy the support
of high-emitting industries while offering voters immediate economic rewards.
Whether this political-economy problem is more or less serious for the carbon
tax than for carbon liability is an open question. We show in Appendix A that
the temptation to default on liability payments actually mirrors the temptation
to continually delay the implementation of a carbon tax. In our opinion, this
tradeoff between abandoning a carbon liability scheme in the future and post-
poning a carbon tax today leans towards a market for liability being the more
effective policy. Indeed, before possibly abandoning the program, at least some
emissions reduction is being achieved.
Interaction between incentives and participation/commitment. The
political-economy problems just discussed unfold along two different dimensions.
The intergenerational problem yields low incentives to reduce emissions, under
both a carbon tax and a carbon liability market. The across-country prob-
lem yields a participation/commitment dilemma: participation for the carbon
tax (temptation to delay indefinitely) and commitment for the carbon liabil-
ity market (temptation to default on payments), respectively. However, both
aspects are interwoven. A low carbon tax, while providing limited incentives
to reduce emissions actually makes participation easier. On the other hand,
delayed participation would make any given carbon tax rate even lower relative
to the optimal one.11 Summing up, with a carbon tax, the incentives problem
alleviates the participation problem whereas the latter reinforces the former.
Similarly, the incentives and commitment problems are related for a carbon
liability market, although somewhat differently. A lack of concern for future
generations yields too much CO2 to be emitted, which exacerbates the com-
mitment problem (due to holding too much liability). Conversely, anticipating
default on liability payments, countries have then little incentive to reduce emis-
sions today. In other words, contrasting with the carbon tax, the incentives and
the commitment problems reinforce each other. In our opinion, this is the most
significant drawback of a carbon liability market.
11The fact that the social cost of carbon increases over time is supported by most integrated
assessment models (see, e.g., US Government, 2013)
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4.3.2 Market design
Following the previous discussion, it becomes apparent that a carbon liability
market requires strong institutions in order to function properly. Implement-
ing a carbon liability market involves five major steps: tracking the emissions
of countries, attributing liability to emitters, assessing harm, imposing liability
payments, and managing the transfer of liability within the market. Hence,
the mechanism minimally requires a central authority. However, several of the
above-mentioned duties are already handled by well-established organizations.
Reliable databases exist for historical emissions. Assessing their role in current
GHG concentration and climate conditions is the focus of many reputable re-
search centers on climate science. Insurance companies frequently assess damage
including when linked to climate events. Most countries routinely honor their
debt. Finally, government bonds are traded daily on international financial
markets.
Regardless, one may still question the credibility of such a mechanism and
in particular its supporting central institution. We argue that the fact that the
latter supports a market actually makes it relatively robust. Indeed, while all
markets require a minimum of supporting institutions, they are rarely called
into question for the purported frailty of these very same institutions. We
believe that turning the climate externality into a financial entity is actually a
source of robustness. It allows the climate problem to transcend mere ecological
concerns, which can easily be underrepresented on the political stage. This
makes the climate problem tangible and more difficult to ignore or downplay.
4.4 Intergenerational fairness
Although our analysis is mainly focused on economic efficiency, we shall observe
that a carbon liability scheme brings significant benefits in terms of intergener-
ational fairness.
4.4.1 Historical emissions and the distribution of the (financial) bur-
den
An important question when addressing the issue of intergenerational fairness is
how to consider emissions that occurred before awareness of the climate change
problem. In law theory, a general principle of justice is that no party can be
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liable in the absence of ’constructive notice’.12 In other words, a country should
not be asked to pay for the climate consequences of emissions made before the
discovery of the impact of greenhouse gases on the climate (the year 1990, which
saw the release of the IPCC’s first assessment report on climate, is usually
considered a landmark year). On the other hand, climate change (including
currently observed impacts) is mainly the consequence of past actions, which
justifies taking into account the historical process leading to its occurrence.
This question highlights further differences between the carbon tax and a
carbon liability scheme. They are normative, related to incentives, and political.
Normative By construction, a tax abides by the legal principle of constructive
notice. It does so because it applies only to current emissions, and at a time
when no country can reasonably ignore that emissions have long-lasting climate
effects. Yet, implicitly, the carbon tax completely absolves past emitters from
the consequences of their past deeds, and places the burden entirely on current
emitters.
By contrast, a carbon liability scheme requires taking a stance on a date
from which countries can be considered responsible for their emissions. This
choice is of importance because the large emitters of the distant past (mainly,
the developed West) differ from the current—and likely future—ones. Thus,
the actual distribution of climate debt will be directly affected by this choice.
Ultimately, unlike a carbon tax, a carbon liability scheme can handle this impor-
tant distributional concern. Furthermore, it does so in a transparent way and
according to a rationale that is grounded in the historical pattern of emissions.
In other words, the redistribution brought about by the choice of a starting date
is strictly rooted in the climate change problem.
Incentives/efficiency The key feature of a carbon liability mechanism is
that the prospect of being liable for future damage creates incentives to reduce
emissions today. Interestingly, the mechanism does not require tracing emissions
back to infinity to provide the ’right’ incentives, in the sense of leading to the
optimal emissions pattern. It is enough, from the point of view of incentives,
to account for anthropogenic emissions starting at some agreed-upon reference
date only.13 As mentioned above, this allows the mechanism to comply with
12We thank Shi-Ling Hsu for bringing this issue to our attention.
13Various choices of a starting date effectively correspond to different sets of lump-sum
transfers between countries.
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the basic legal principle of constructive notice while providing a tool to address
the normative role of historical emissions.14
By contrast, a carbon tax suffers from the usual tension between efficiency
and redistribution. If set at the optimal level, so as to implements the optimal
emissions pattern, it is a regressive instrument because it is disproportionately
generous towards past emitters, who also happen to be today’s richest countries.
Any departure from this rate, while possibly having positive distributional im-
pacts, will inevitably undermine the efficiency of the tax.
Political Because of this last aspect, a carbon liability scheme may actually
ease international negotiations. Indeed, it allows countries to address issues of
fairness without impinging on efficiency. By contrast, climate negotiations asso-
ciated with a carbon tax—or, more generally, with emission targets—necessarily
trade off fairness for efficiency, which leads to compromises that are deemed un-
acceptable by some on efficiency grounds and by others on distributive ones.
The coalition formation generated by the Kyoto Protocol (developed countries
on one side and developing countries on the other) is telling.
From a political point of view, an advantage of the carbon liability scheme is
that it brings to light a stumbling block of climate negotiations that, although
critical, is usually not explicitly addressed. Indeed, it offers a built-in framework
to decide the issue of responsibility for past emissions. This allows to depart
from the crude solutions usually put together to face the obvious heterogeneity
of countries in development status and wealth, like partitioning countries into
different groups or “Annexes”. By setting a date from which emissions will be
accounted for, a carbon liability mechanism explicitly acknowledges historical
responsibility and specifies the degree to which each country should be held
accountable in relation to the amount of past emissions. Hence, responsibility
is no longer binary.
Moreover, fine-tuning the starting date allows for smooth adjustments in the
responsibility borne by countries. The earlier this date, the higher the burden
to more developed countries, as per the high correlation of past emissions with
current GDP levels. Finally, the choice of a starting date differs significantly
from choosing thresholds to partition countries into groups. First, the choice
of a starting date affects all countries, and not just the countries at the margin
14Obviously, for incentives to exist, ’actual notice’ is also needed; i.e., countries must not
only be aware of the fact that they are causing harm (constructive notice), but must also be
informed that they will be considered liable for future climate damage.
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of belonging or not to a category (i.e., located close to a threshold). Next,
the adjustments in the starting date affects countries gradually, as opposed to
having decisive consequences to those same marginal countries whereas others
are not affected at all. In terms of climate agreements, negotiations about the
starting date will re-balance the stakes and spread them from a few countries
to all nations instead of entrenching the positions of opposed coalitions.
4.4.2 Increased government accountability
A carbon liability scheme converts into financial debt what current generations
owe to future generations for the climate harm that their emissions will induce.
By making this debt financial, rather than environmental, it becomes both
explicit and more difficult to ignore.
It becomes explicit because the financial value of the debt is indeed a market
assessment of future harm. The market (liability) price aggregates all available
private information and makes it public. Thus, the total liability value at any
current date is the best possible estimate of the cost of future climate harm.
In addition, the debt to future generations also becomes more difficult to
ignore. An environmental debt remains a moral debt, on which default has few
consequences for the debtor. By contrast, defaulting on financial debt brings
about tangible consequences to a country’s economy, in particular through re-
duced borrowing and trade opportunities.
4.4.3 Making provisions for the future
A consequence of the financial nature of the debt and the induced increased gov-
ernment accountability is that governments have no choice but to save resources
for future generations. To be clear, this does not imply that governments should
immobilize capital in the event of future climate harm, which would be an in-
efficient use of capital. As we saw in Section 4.2.3, countries are free to choose
how to levy the monies they deem necessary to face their future liability pay-
ments. Moreover, governments can choose to invest these funds productively.
What matters for a country, and in particular for its credit rating, is its overall
balance sheet (the value of its assets net of its debt, including carbon liability).
One may question the ability of governments to make provisions for the
future. For example, several countries already face difficulties in honoring their
promises to retirees. However, it is noteworthy that this tends to be the case
of countries that have adopted a pay-as-you-go retirement scheme. In such
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systems, the current working generation bears the charge of the benefits to the
previous one. There is no explicit debt. Hence, the financial balance is not
monitored and, therefore, there are no tools to cope with the imbalance created
by the aging of populations.
By contrast, in a fully funded pension scheme, the balance between contri-
butions and future benefits is closely monitored. Pension funds are important
financial actors, the performance of which is the object of constant scrutiny.
Contributions are regularly adjusted in a system of defined benefits, whereas
benefits follow market returns in a system of defined contribution. Either way,
there are no lasting imbalances.
We argue that the very act of making explicit (and financial) the otherwise
moral debt to future generations results in a closer examination of wealth trans-
fers across generations. Keeping with the analogy, a carbon tax is tantamount to
a “pay-as-you-emit” scheme, whereas a carbon liability market resembles a fully
funded system, where liability returns are studied closely by financial markets.
4.5 Exposure to risk
Lastly, an examination of climate policy would not be complete without dis-
cussing the risk dimension, which we do now.
4.5.1 Addressing inequalities in realized climate harm
A central feature of the liability approach is its ex post nature: its design is
based on realized uncertainty. By contrast, a carbon tax embodies an ex ante
viewpoint: what matters are the expected consequences of emissions so as to in-
duce emitters to internalize climate harm in their decision making. The realized
distribution of harm is of no importance because it does not affect efficiency.
However, if realized inequalities have any value, a liability approach is better by
construction. In terms of incentives, it induces the same emissions allocation,
but in terms of distribution, it strictly dominates the carbon tax by embedding
compensations to countries actually affected by climate harm.
4.5.2 Risk is borne by those who are responsible for it
With a carbon tax, the emitting generation is completely absolved of the con-
sequences of its emissions upon paying the tax. The risk of climate damage
imposed by the accumulated emissions is borne by the most vulnerable coun-
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tries, regardless of responsibility. It is one thing to share risk among countries,
but quite another to be fully exonerated of the risk imposed onto others. Given
the magnitude of the possible harm, full exoneration seems thoroughly unrea-
sonable.
By contrast, with carbon liability, risk is now borne by those who are re-
sponsible for its occurrence. Because liability payments are used to compensate
realized harm, it is the emitting countries that are held accountable for the
climate risk—to the tune of their cumulative emissions—rather than those ex-
posed to climate damage. When liability is traded, the purchasing countries
will end up bearing the risk. However, not only will they have chosen to do so,
but they will have been compensated for doing so by financial gain through the
liability price.
4.5.3 Varying debt payments
A possible objection to the carbon liability approach is that it exacts varying
debt payments from liable countries. This follows from the fact that the magni-
tude of the payments is determined by the magnitude of realized climate harm.
In fact, with a carbon liability scheme, countries are not contracting on mone-
tary amounts determined ex ante but on a share of future, but also uncertain,
climate harm.
By contrast, a carbon tax has the apparent advantage of exacting payments
that are known at the time of emission. Thus, it facilitates the decision pro-
cess of emitters. However, this advantage hides the fact that climate harm is
inherently fluctuating and unpredictable, so that realized harm almost always
differs from expected harm. The difference between actual harm and expected
harm is effectively paid by the emitters themselves—should the realized harm
fall short of expectations—or, worse, by those countries who bear the brunt of
the consequences in the form of (unpredicted) harm—should the realized harm
exceed that conveyed by the tax rate.
Under a liability scheme, those variations would be fully compensated by
liability payments. More generally, a liability scheme translates into financial
terms the very same risk (although environmental, not financial) that countries
face under a carbon tax. In other words, it does not introduce risk; rather, it
makes explicit risk that was already there.
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5 Conclusion
We have proposed a new approach to climate policy based on the trading of
carbon liability between countries and have demonstrated that it yields the
same emissions patterns as the optimal carbon tax.
Although it adopts an ex post approach, unlike traditional economic instru-
ments, our proposal is merely an unconventional interpretation of the familiar
Pigovian principle. Recall that Pigovian taxation was historically developed in
a static setting, where the externality could plainly be observed. The climate
problem adds two dimensions to the externality: duration and uncertainty. The
Pigovian logic can therefore be revisited accordingly. If we take the Pigovian
logic to mean the internalization by agents of all aspects related to the exter-
nality, then our proposal applies this logic in full by relying on the countries’
own views about discounting and on their own beliefs about future damage to
induce them to internalize the externality. This increased decentralization ex-
plains the significant advantages of carbon liability over the carbon tax: it is
less informationally demanding, it allows for disagreements in preferences and
beliefs through decentralization, and it exacts payments commensurate to actual
climate damage.
In addition, a liability scheme solves an important problem of climate justice,
which is that upon implementing a carbon tax, or any other ex ante instrument,
emitting countries are absolved from all climate risk. By contrast, a liability
scheme holds countries (financially) accountable for the climate harm borne of
their emissions over time. This gives governments an incentive to take seriously
the climate change problem and to take proactive measures.
Our proposal raises at least one important political-economy concern, how-
ever. Countries may find it tempting to abandon the carbon liability program
in the future as payments increase due to climate harm becoming more pro-
nounced over time. Problems of incentives to renegotiate should be considered
explicitly in this context, as done in Harstad (2012). We leave this for future
research.
Another question that needs to be addressed explicitly is that of country
participation. The expected net discounted payoffs of countries are identical
under a carbon liability scheme and under a carbon tax. Adopting a dynamic
framework, we have seen that participation to a liability scheme is cheaper than
participation to a carbon tax. However, as made evident by the literature on
international environmental agreements and, in particular, by the literature on
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coalition formation (Barrett, 1994; Bloch, 1996; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis,
2015), participation of one country depends on that of others. Therefore, the
question of participation should be addressed explicitly in future work, for ex-
ample along the lines of Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2015).
That being said, the liability approach reduces the number of dimensions of
potential disagreement between would-be participants. Indeed, agreeing on a
carbon tax requires agreement on the discount factor and on the magnitude of
yet unrealized climate events far off in the future, two highly debated issues that
are unlikely to garner consensus anytime soon. By contrast, the liability scheme
’only’ requires agreement on a starting date from which emissions should be
counted. While such an agreement is by no means guaranteed, as there is a clear
tension between developed and developing countries in this regard, reducing the
dimensions of potential disagreement may significantly improve the likelihood
of a powerful joint international effort.
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A Appendix
This appendix formalizes the discussion introduced in Section 4.3.1 about the
temptation of countries to default on carbon debt. Section A.1 lays down the
formal setup, which extends that of the Introduction to a multi-period frame-
work. Section A.2, shows that the temptation to default actually mirrors that
of postponing the implementation of a carbon tax.
A.1 The formal setup
In order to make explicit the statement of Section 4.3.1, we present a richer
model than the one in the introduction. Denote by hit the function representing
the flow of stochastic harm borne by Country i at period t. This harm depends
on the current stock of anthropogenic CO2 in the atmosphere, Zt, which is
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itself the sum of the stock of CO2 that can be attributed to each country: Z
i
t =∑t
s=−∞ γ
sXis (it is the sum of its past emissions X
i
s, for all s ≤ t, accounting
for the decay rate γ).15,16 The global flow of harm at period t is the sum of the
harm borne by individual countries: ht (Zt) =
∑
i h
i
t (Zt).
With this notation, the so-called Pigovian tax rate writes:
τt ≡ Et
[
+∞∑
s=t
βs−t
dhs
dXt
]
, (4)
the discounted sum of expected future marginal harm.
Our proposal consists in converting CO2 emissions into financial debt. More
precisely, in each period, Country i is required to contribute to an international
climate fund to the tune of µtZ
i
t where
µt ≡ dht/dZt (5)
is the (current) marginal climate harm due to anthropogenic emissions.17
Throughout, we shall work under the usual Pigovian assumption that strate-
gic issues associated with the relative sizes of countries can be ignored. Formally,
we assume that:
dµs
dXit
=
dτs
dXit
= 0 ∀t ≤ s ∀i, (6)
which implies that no country can affect the emissions decision of other countries
through its impact on the liability payments (or the tax rate).
Moreover, we assume for expositional purposes that domestic marginal harm
is negligible compared to global marginal harm:
dhit/dZt  dht/dZt ∀i∀t, (7)
which implies that none of the climate harm is internalized in the absence of a
policy instrument.
While not completely realistic, these assumptions makes it easier to compare
our proposal to the usual schemes—namely, the Pigovian carbon tax and cap-
15We could allow for the decay rate, γ, to vary with concentrations of CO2, but refrain from
doing so for the sake of readability.
16As mentioned, it is actually not required to trace back emissions to infinity. In fact,
accounting only for, say, post-1990 emissions would result in the very same emissions pat-
tern. The truncation simply amounts to lump-sum transfers to (developed) countries while
preserving incentives at the margin.
17Unlike in tort law, we do not aim for ”full liability” because, from an efficiency standpoint,
it is not optimal to cover the total harm.
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and-trade solutions—, which have been derived under the same assumptions,
and allows us to focus on the general features of the mechanism.
Under our assumptions,
dZs
dXt
= γs−t ∀t ≤ s, (8)
so that
dhs
dXt
= γs−t
dhs
dZs
∀t ≤ s (9)
and, in turn,
τt = Et
[
+∞∑
s=t
(γβ)
s−t dhs
dZs
]
. (10)
Under a carbon tax, Country i evaluates its present expected net benefit as:
PENBit =
+∞∑
s=t
βs−tEt
[
bis
(
Xis
)− his (Zs)− τsXis] , (11)
and chooses an emissions stream
{
Xit
}+∞
t=0
such that:
dbit
dXit
=
+∞∑
s=t
βs−tEt
[
dhis
dZs
dZs
dXit
+
dτs
dXit
Xis + τs
dXis
dXit
]
(12)
=
{
+∞∑
s=t
βs−tEt
[
dhis
dZs
γs−t
]}
+ τt (13)
=
{
+∞∑
s=t
(βγ)
s−t
Et
[
dhis
dZs
+
dhs
dZs
]}
(14)
≈
{
+∞∑
s=t
(βγ)
s−t
Et
[
dhs
dZs
]}
= τt, (15)
where the second line follows from Expression (8), Assumption (6), and the fact
that emissions across periods are independent decisions, so that dXis/dX
i
t = 0
whenever s > t. The third line follows from the expression of the tax rate (Ex-
pression 10) and the fourth from Assumption (7), which states that no country
is large enough to internalize a significant portion of the global harm.
Under a carbon liability scheme, Country i evaluates its present expected
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net benefit as:
PENBit =
+∞∑
s=t
βs−tEt
[
bis
(
Xis
)− his (Zs)− µsZis] , (16)
and then chooses an emissions stream
{
Xit
}+∞
t=0
such that:
dbit
dXit
=
+∞∑
s=t
βs−tEt
[
dhis
dZs
dZs
dXit
+
dµs
dXit
Zis + µs
dZis
dXit
]
(17)
=
+∞∑
s=t
βs−tEt
[
dhis
dZs
γs−t + 0 + µsγs−t
]
(18)
=
+∞∑
s=t
(βγ)
s−t
Et
[
dhis
dZs
+
dhs
dZs
]
(19)
≈
{
+∞∑
s=t
(βγ)
s−t
Et
[
dhs
dZs
]}
= τt. (20)
Again, the second line follows from Expression (8) and Assumption (6). The
third line follows from the expression of the liability payment (Expression 5)
and the fourth from Assumption (7). The comparison of (14) and (19) makes it
clear that even without Assumption (7), both instruments decentralize the very
same allocation.18
A.2 Defaulting on carbon debt vs. delaying the carbon
tax
The public good character attached to climate policy means that all climate
instruments are subject to the problem of free riding. In other words, at the
individual level, one is always tempted to abandon (or to not implement) a
climate policy, regardless of the instrument (liability or tax). This section com-
pares in turn the relative temptation to abandon the mechanism and the relative
temptation to delay the implementation of both mechanisms. We shall assume
throughout that the decision of a country does not affect the behavior of other
countries. This assumption is in line with the Pigovian assumptions (6) and (7)
above.
18In a different setting, Benchekroun and Long (1998) establishes a similar equivalence
between an optimal tax on pollution stock with an optimal tax on flows.
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A.2.1 On the relative temptation to abandon the policy
On the one hand, a drawback of the liability scheme is that countries face an
increasing temptation to default on their accumulated carbon debt. On the
other hand, because climate damage is likely to increase over time, there is also
an increasing temptation to not participate in a carbon tax.
The expected cost of abandoning the carbon tax at a given date T is equal
to:
∆tax,T = ET
{
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
[
bit
(
Xit
)− τtXit − hit (Zt)]− +∞∑
t=T
βt−T
[
bit
(
X˜it,T
)
− hit
(
Z˜t,T
)]}
,
(21)
where Xi and Zi (respectively, X˜i and Z˜i) refer to the carbon flow and stock in
the case where country i is taxed (respectively, no longer taxed).
Likewise, the expected cost of defaulting on carbon debt from date T onward is
equal to:
∆liability,T = ET
{
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
[
bit
(
Xit
)− µtZit − hit (Zt)]− +∞∑
t=T
βt−T
[
bit
(
X˜it,T
)
− hit
(
Z˜t,T
)]}
.
(22)
The rest of the argument will make use of the fact that Xi and Zi are
identical under both instruments (recall Expressions (15) and (20)). Moreover,
this implies that if the country abandons the policy, the subsequent emissions
flows and stocks, X˜i and Z˜i), will continue to be identical. Therefore, the
difference lies only in the financial payments that countries make under both
schemes:
∆tax,T −∆liability,T = −ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T τtXit
]
+ ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
βt−TµtZit
]
(23)
The financial gain from reneging on the carbon tax at date T onward is given
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by:
ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T τtXit
]
= ET
{
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
d
dXit
{
Et
[
+∞∑
s=t
βs−ths (Zs)
]}
×Xit
}
(24)
= ET
{
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
d
dXit
[
+∞∑
s=t
βs−ths (Zs)
]
×Xit
}
(25)
= ET
{
+∞∑
t=T
+∞∑
s=t
βs−T
d
dXit
[hs (Zs)]×Xit
}
(26)
= ET
{
+∞∑
s=T
s∑
t=T
βs−T
d
dXit
[hs (Zs)]×Xit
}
(27)
= ET
{
+∞∑
s=T
s∑
t=T
βs−T γs−t
dhs
dZs
×Xit
}
(28)
Similarly, the financial gain from defaulting on carbon debt at date T writes as
follows:
ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
βt−TµtZit
]
= ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
dht
dZt
×
(
γtZi0 +
t∑
s=1
Xisγ
t−s
)]
(29)
= ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
dht
dZt
×
(
γt−T
(
γTZi0 +
T−1∑
s=1
Xisγ
T−s
)
+
t∑
s=T
Xisγ
t−s
)]
(30)
= ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
dht
dZt
×
(
γt−T × γ × ZiT−1 +
t∑
s=T
Xisγ
t−s
)]
(31)
= ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
dht
dZt
×
(
t∑
s=T
Xisγ
t−s
)]
+ ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
(βγ)
t−T dht
dZt
γZiT−1
]
(32)
= ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
t∑
s=T
βt−T γt−sXis
dht
dZt
]
+ ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
(βγ)
t−T dht
dZt
]
γZiT−1
(33)
Comparing expressions (28) and (33), we obtain that defaulting on carbon
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debt is more tempting (i.e., less costly) than reneging on the carbon tax:
∆tax,T −∆liability,T = ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
βt−TµtZit
]
− ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T τtXit
]
(34)
= ET
[
+∞∑
t=T
(βγ)
t−T dht
dZt
]
γZiT−1 (35)
= τT
(
γZiT−1
)
> 0. (36)
Notice that the magnitude of the difference is equal to the cost of the carbon
stock inherited from the past,
(
γZiT−1
)
, priced at the carbon tax rate of the
current period, τT . This difference does not account for the above-mentioned
costs associated with defaulting on (financialized) carbon debt. These costs
are relevant for the liability scheme but do not arise in the case of the carbon
tax. Hence, the above difference constitutes an overestimate of the relative
temptation to default when adopting a liability scheme rather than relying on
a carbon tax.
A.2.2 On the relative temptation to delay the policy
On the other hand, a drawback of the carbon tax is that its adoption is costly up
front. This is because it requires payments immediately for climate damage that
may take decades or more to materialize. By contrast, a liability scheme asks for
payments upon the realization of damage, effectively spreading payments over
time. This makes the liability scheme more likely to be adopted in the short
run. To be precise, compare the net benefits of both schemes over the first L
periods, computed from the point of view of date zero:
∆liability−tax,L = E0
{
L−1∑
t=0
βt
[
Bit
(
Xit
)− µtZit −Dit (Zt)]− L−1∑
t=0
βt
[
Bit
(
Xit
)− τtXit −Dit (Zt)]
}
(37)
= E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
βtτtX
i
t
]
− E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
βtµtZ
i
t
]
(38)
where the second equality comes from the fact that both policies implement the
same emissions path.
Computing each term separately, we obtain:
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E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
βtτtX
i
t
]
= E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
βt
d
dXit
{
Et
[
+∞∑
s=t
βs−ths (Zs)
]}
Xit
]
(39)
= E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
βt
{
+∞∑
s=t
(βγ)
s−t dhs
dZs
}
Xit
]
(40)
= E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
+∞∑
s=t
βsγs−t
dhs
dZs
Xit
]
(41)
= E0
+∞∑
s=0
min{s,L−1}∑
t=0
βsγs−t
dhs
dZs
Xit
 (42)
= E0
[
L−2∑
s=0
s∑
t=0
βsγs−t
dhs
dZs
Xit
]
+ E0
[
+∞∑
s=L−1
L−1∑
t=0
βsγs−t
dhs
dZs
Xit
]
(43)
= E0
[
L−2∑
s=0
s∑
t=0
βsγs−t
dhs
dZs
Xit
]
+ E0
[
βL−1
+∞∑
s=L−1
(βγ)
s−L+1 dhs
dZs
L−1∑
t=0
γL−1−tXit
]
(44)
and
E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
βtµtZ
i
t
]
= E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
βt
dht
dZt
×
(
t∑
s=0
Xisγ
t−s
)]
(45)
= E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
(βγ)
t dht
dZt
×
(
t∑
s=0
Xisγ
−s
)]
(46)
= E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
t∑
s=0
βtγt−s
dht
dZt
Xis
]
(47)
= E0
[
L−1∑
s=0
s∑
t=0
βsγs−t
dhs
dZs
Xit
]
(48)
= E0
[
L−2∑
s=0
s∑
t=0
βsγs−t
dhs
dZs
Xit
]
+ E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
βL−1γL−1−t
dhL−1
dZL−1
Xit
]
(49)
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Taking the difference, we get:
∆liability−tax,L = E0
[
βL−1
+∞∑
s=L−1
(βγ)
s−L+1 dhs
dZs
L−1∑
t=0
γL−1−tXit
]
− E0
[
L−1∑
t=0
βL−1γL−1−t
dhL−1
dZL−1
Xit
]
(50)
= βL−1E0
[
+∞∑
s=L−1
(βγ)
s−L+1 dhs
dZs
L−1∑
t=0
γL−1−tXit
]
− βL−1E0
[
dhL−1
dZL−1
L−1∑
t=0
γL−1−tXit
]
(51)
= βL−1E0
[
+∞∑
s=L
(βγ)
s−L+1 dhs
dZs
L−1∑
t=0
γL−1−tXit
]
(52)
= βL−1E0
[
(βγ) τLZ
i
L−1
]
, (53)
so that delaying for L periods from the point of view of date zero writes:
∆liability−tax,L = βLE0
[
τL
(
γZiL−1
)]
> 0 (54)
The sign of the above difference is positive, implying that the liability scheme
is strictly less costly over any finite horizon. Its magnitude is the (discounted)
expected cost of the inherited stock at date L.
Despite the compounded discount factor, βL, the above difference is not nec-
essarily negligible, even if L is large. In fact, when damage is a convex function of
total stock, and stock increases over time, the tax rate τL = EL
[∑+∞
s=L (γβ)
s−L ∂Ds
∂Zs
]
increases with L.19 Therefore, the size of the difference can even increase with
L if τL+1/τL > 1/β. With discount factors close to one, this is a distinct
possibility.
A.2.3 Comparison
Evaluated from the point of view of date zero, the expected relative temptation
to default on carbon debt writes:
βTE0 [∆tax,T −∆liability,T ] = βTE0
[
τT
(
γZiT−1
)]
> 0 (55)
Comparing with Expression (54), we see that the relative temptation to default
on carbon debt mirrors the relative temptation to delay the implementation of
19As mentioned, the fact that the social cost of carbon increases over time is supported by
most integrated assessment models.
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a carbon tax.
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